435 lines
17 KiB
JavaScript
435 lines
17 KiB
JavaScript
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import _defineProperty from "@babel/runtime/helpers/defineProperty";
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/*
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Copyright 2023 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
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Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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You may obtain a copy of the License at
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http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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limitations under the License.
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*/
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/**
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* `matrix-js-sdk/lib/crypto-api`: End-to-end encryption support.
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*
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* The most important type is {@link CryptoApi}, an instance of which can be retrieved via
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* {@link MatrixClient.getCrypto}.
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*
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* @packageDocumentation
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*/
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/**
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* The options to start device dehydration.
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*/
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/**
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* Public interface to the cryptography parts of the js-sdk
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*/
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/** A reason code for a failure to decrypt an event. */
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export let DecryptionFailureCode = /*#__PURE__*/function (DecryptionFailureCode) {
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/** Message was encrypted with a Megolm session whose keys have not been shared with us. */
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DecryptionFailureCode["MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID"] = "MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID";
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/** A special case of {@link MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID}: the sender has told us it is withholding the key. */
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DecryptionFailureCode["MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD"] = "MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD";
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/** A special case of {@link MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD}: the sender has told us it is withholding the key, because the current device is unverified. */
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DecryptionFailureCode["MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD_FOR_UNVERIFIED_DEVICE"] = "MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD_FOR_UNVERIFIED_DEVICE";
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/** Message was encrypted with a Megolm session which has been shared with us, but in a later ratchet state. */
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DecryptionFailureCode["OLM_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX"] = "OLM_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX";
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/**
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* Message was sent before the current device was created; there is no key backup on the server, so this
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* decryption failure is expected.
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*/
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DecryptionFailureCode["HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_NO_KEY_BACKUP"] = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_NO_KEY_BACKUP";
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/**
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* Message was sent before the current device was created; there was a key backup on the server, but we don't
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* seem to have access to the backup. (Probably we don't have the right key.)
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*/
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DecryptionFailureCode["HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_BACKUP_UNCONFIGURED"] = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_BACKUP_UNCONFIGURED";
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/**
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* Message was sent before the current device was created; there was a (usable) key backup on the server, but we
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* still can't decrypt. (Either the session isn't in the backup, or we just haven't gotten around to checking yet.)
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*/
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DecryptionFailureCode["HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_WORKING_BACKUP"] = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_WORKING_BACKUP";
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/**
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* Message was sent when the user was not a member of the room.
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*/
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DecryptionFailureCode["HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_USER_NOT_JOINED"] = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_USER_NOT_JOINED";
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/**
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* The sender's identity is not verified, but was previously verified.
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*/
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DecryptionFailureCode["SENDER_IDENTITY_PREVIOUSLY_VERIFIED"] = "SENDER_IDENTITY_PREVIOUSLY_VERIFIED";
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/**
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* The sender device is not cross-signed. This will only be used if the
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* device isolation mode is set to `OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode`.
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*/
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DecryptionFailureCode["UNSIGNED_SENDER_DEVICE"] = "UNSIGNED_SENDER_DEVICE";
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/**
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* We weren't able to link the message back to any known device. This will
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* only be used if the device isolation mode is set to `OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode`.
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*/
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DecryptionFailureCode["UNKNOWN_SENDER_DEVICE"] = "UNKNOWN_SENDER_DEVICE";
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/** Unknown or unclassified error. */
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DecryptionFailureCode["UNKNOWN_ERROR"] = "UNKNOWN_ERROR";
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return DecryptionFailureCode;
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}({});
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/** Base {@link DeviceIsolationMode} kind. */
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export let DeviceIsolationModeKind = /*#__PURE__*/function (DeviceIsolationModeKind) {
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DeviceIsolationModeKind[DeviceIsolationModeKind["AllDevicesIsolationMode"] = 0] = "AllDevicesIsolationMode";
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DeviceIsolationModeKind[DeviceIsolationModeKind["OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode"] = 1] = "OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode";
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return DeviceIsolationModeKind;
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}({});
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/**
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* A type of {@link DeviceIsolationMode}.
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*
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* Message encryption keys are shared with all devices in the room, except in case of
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* verified user problems (see {@link errorOnVerifiedUserProblems}).
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*
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* Events from all senders are always decrypted (and should be decorated with message shields in case
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* of authenticity warnings, see {@link EventEncryptionInfo}).
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*
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* `AllDevicesIsolationMode` is used in the legacy, non-'exclude insecure devices' mode in Element Web. It is not
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* recommended (see {@link https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4153 | MSC4153}).
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*/
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export class AllDevicesIsolationMode {
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/**
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*
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* @param errorOnVerifiedUserProblems - Behavior when sharing keys to remote devices.
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*
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* If set to `true`, sharing keys will fail (i.e. message sending will fail) with an error if:
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* - The user was previously verified but is not anymore, or:
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* - A verified user has some unverified devices (not cross-signed).
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*
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* If `false`, the keys will be distributed as usual. In this case, the client UX should display
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* warnings to inform the user about problematic devices/users, and stop them hitting this case.
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*/
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constructor(errorOnVerifiedUserProblems) {
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_defineProperty(this, "kind", DeviceIsolationModeKind.AllDevicesIsolationMode);
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this.errorOnVerifiedUserProblems = errorOnVerifiedUserProblems;
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}
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}
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/**
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* A type of {@link DeviceIsolationMode}.
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*
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* Message encryption keys are only shared with devices that have been cross-signed by their owner.
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* Encryption will throw an error if a verified user replaces their identity.
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*
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* Events are decrypted only if they come from a cross-signed device. Other events will result in a decryption
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* failure. (To access the failure reason, see {@link MatrixEvent.decryptionFailureReason}.)
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*
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* `OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode` corresponds to the 'Exclude insecure devices' mode in Element Web, which is
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* recommended by {@link https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4153 | MSC4153}.
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*/
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export class OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode {
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constructor() {
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_defineProperty(this, "kind", DeviceIsolationModeKind.OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode);
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}
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}
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/**
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* DeviceIsolationMode represents the mode of device isolation used when encrypting or decrypting messages.
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* It can be one of two types: {@link AllDevicesIsolationMode} or {@link OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode}.
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*
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* Only supported by rust Crypto.
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*/
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/**
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* Options object for `CryptoApi.bootstrapCrossSigning`.
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*/
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/**
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* Represents the ways in which we trust a user
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*/
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export class UserVerificationStatus {
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/** @internal */
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constructor(crossSigningVerified, crossSigningVerifiedBefore, known, needsUserApproval = false) {
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/**
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* Indicates if we have saved a known identity for this user. Typically, this means that we share a
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* room with them (or have done in the past).
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*
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* If this is `false`, then the other flags ({@link isCrossSigningVerified}, {@link wasCrossSigningVerified},
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* {@link needsUserApproval}) will also be `false`. This means that we haven't seen this user before.
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*
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* If this is `true`, then there are further possibilities:
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*
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* - If {@link isCrossSigningVerified} returns `true`, then we have cryptographically verified the current
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* identity of this user: that is the highest form of trust we have.
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*
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* - If {@link needsUserApproval} is `true`, that means that the user has changed their identity.
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*
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* - Otherwise, the user is "TOFU trusted": we have a record of their identity, and, typically, will share
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* encrypted content with them as long as they retain that identity.
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*/
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_defineProperty(this, "known", void 0);
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/**
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* Indicates if the identity has changed in a way that needs user approval.
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*
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* This happens if the identity has changed since we first saw it, *unless* the new identity has also been verified
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* by our user (eg via an interactive verification).
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*
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* To rectify this, either:
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*
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* * Conduct a verification of the new identity via {@link CryptoApi.requestVerificationDM}.
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* * Pin the new identity, via {@link CryptoApi.pinCurrentUserIdentity}.
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*
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* @returns true if the identity has changed in a way that needs user approval.
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*/
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_defineProperty(this, "needsUserApproval", void 0);
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this.crossSigningVerified = crossSigningVerified;
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this.crossSigningVerifiedBefore = crossSigningVerifiedBefore;
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this.known = known;
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this.needsUserApproval = needsUserApproval;
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}
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/**
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* @returns true if this user is verified via any means
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*/
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isVerified() {
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return this.isCrossSigningVerified();
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}
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/**
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* @returns true if this user is verified via cross signing
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*/
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isCrossSigningVerified() {
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return this.crossSigningVerified;
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}
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/**
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* @returns true if we ever verified this user before (at least for
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* the history of verifications observed by this device).
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*/
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wasCrossSigningVerified() {
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return this.crossSigningVerifiedBefore;
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}
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/**
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* @returns true if this user's key is trusted on first use
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*
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* @deprecated No longer supported, with the Rust crypto stack.
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*/
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isTofu() {
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return false;
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}
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}
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export class DeviceVerificationStatus {
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constructor(opts) {
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/**
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* True if this device has been signed by its owner (and that signature verified).
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*
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* This doesn't necessarily mean that we have verified the device, since we may not have verified the
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* owner's cross-signing key.
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*/
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_defineProperty(this, "signedByOwner", void 0);
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/**
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* True if this device has been verified via cross signing.
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*
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* This does *not* take into account `trustCrossSignedDevices`.
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*/
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_defineProperty(this, "crossSigningVerified", void 0);
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/**
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* TODO: tofu magic wtf does this do?
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*/
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_defineProperty(this, "tofu", void 0);
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/**
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* True if the device has been marked as locally verified.
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*/
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_defineProperty(this, "localVerified", void 0);
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/**
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* True if the client has been configured to trust cross-signed devices via {@link CryptoApi#setTrustCrossSignedDevices}.
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*/
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_defineProperty(this, "trustCrossSignedDevices", void 0);
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this.signedByOwner = opts.signedByOwner ?? false;
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this.crossSigningVerified = opts.crossSigningVerified ?? false;
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this.tofu = opts.tofu ?? false;
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this.localVerified = opts.localVerified ?? false;
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this.trustCrossSignedDevices = opts.trustCrossSignedDevices ?? false;
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}
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/**
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* Check if we should consider this device "verified".
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*
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* A device is "verified" if either:
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* * it has been manually marked as such via {@link CryptoApi.setDeviceVerified}.
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* * it has been cross-signed with a verified signing key, **and** the client has been configured to trust
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* cross-signed devices via {@link CryptoApi.setTrustCrossSignedDevices}.
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*
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* @returns true if this device is verified via any means.
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*/
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isVerified() {
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return this.localVerified || this.trustCrossSignedDevices && this.crossSigningVerified;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Enum representing the different stages of importing room keys.
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*
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* This is the type of the `stage` property of {@link ImportRoomKeyProgressData}.
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*/
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export let ImportRoomKeyStage = /*#__PURE__*/function (ImportRoomKeyStage) {
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/**
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* The stage where room keys are being fetched.
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*
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* @see {@link ImportRoomKeyFetchProgress}.
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*/
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ImportRoomKeyStage["Fetch"] = "fetch";
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/**
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* The stage where room keys are being loaded.
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*
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* @see {@link ImportRoomKeyLoadProgress}.
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*/
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ImportRoomKeyStage["LoadKeys"] = "load_keys";
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return ImportRoomKeyStage;
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}({});
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/**
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* Type representing the progress during the 'fetch' stage of the room key import process.
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*
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* @see {@link ImportRoomKeyProgressData}.
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*/
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/**
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* Type representing the progress during the 'load_keys' stage of the room key import process.
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*
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* @see {@link ImportRoomKeyProgressData}.
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*/
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/**
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* Room key import progress report.
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* Used when calling {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeys},
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* {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeysAsJson} or {@link CryptoApi#restoreKeyBackup} as the parameter of
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* the progressCallback. Used to display feedback.
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*/
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/**
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* Options object for {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeys} and
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* {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeysAsJson}.
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*/
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/**
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* The result of a call to {@link CryptoApi.getCrossSigningStatus}.
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*/
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/**
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* Crypto callbacks provided by the application
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*/
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/**
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* The result of a call to {@link CryptoApi.getSecretStorageStatus}.
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*/
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/**
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* Parameter of {@link CryptoApi#bootstrapSecretStorage}
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*/
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/** Types of cross-signing key */
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export let CrossSigningKey = /*#__PURE__*/function (CrossSigningKey) {
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CrossSigningKey["Master"] = "master_key";
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CrossSigningKey["SelfSigning"] = "self_signing_key";
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CrossSigningKey["UserSigning"] = "user_signing_key";
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return CrossSigningKey;
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}({});
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/** All of a user's cross-signing keys.
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* @see https://spec.matrix.org/v1.7/client-server-api/#post_matrixclientv3keysdevice_signingupload
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*/
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/**
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* Information on one of the cross-signing keys.
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* @see https://spec.matrix.org/v1.7/client-server-api/#post_matrixclientv3keysdevice_signingupload
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*/
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||
|
|
|
||
|
|
/**
|
||
|
|
* Recovery key created by {@link CryptoApi#createRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase} or {@link CreateSecretStorageOpts#createSecretStorageKey}.
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
/**
|
||
|
|
* Result type of {@link CryptoApi#getEncryptionInfoForEvent}.
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
/**
|
||
|
|
* Types of shield to be shown for {@link EventEncryptionInfo#shieldColour}.
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
export let EventShieldColour = /*#__PURE__*/function (EventShieldColour) {
|
||
|
|
EventShieldColour[EventShieldColour["NONE"] = 0] = "NONE";
|
||
|
|
EventShieldColour[EventShieldColour["GREY"] = 1] = "GREY";
|
||
|
|
EventShieldColour[EventShieldColour["RED"] = 2] = "RED";
|
||
|
|
return EventShieldColour;
|
||
|
|
}({});
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
/**
|
||
|
|
* Reason codes for {@link EventEncryptionInfo#shieldReason}.
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
export let EventShieldReason = /*#__PURE__*/function (EventShieldReason) {
|
||
|
|
/** An unknown reason from the crypto library (if you see this, it is a bug in matrix-js-sdk). */
|
||
|
|
EventShieldReason[EventShieldReason["UNKNOWN"] = 0] = "UNKNOWN";
|
||
|
|
/** "Encrypted by an unverified user." */
|
||
|
|
EventShieldReason[EventShieldReason["UNVERIFIED_IDENTITY"] = 1] = "UNVERIFIED_IDENTITY";
|
||
|
|
/** "Encrypted by a device not verified by its owner." */
|
||
|
|
EventShieldReason[EventShieldReason["UNSIGNED_DEVICE"] = 2] = "UNSIGNED_DEVICE";
|
||
|
|
/** "Encrypted by an unknown or deleted device." */
|
||
|
|
EventShieldReason[EventShieldReason["UNKNOWN_DEVICE"] = 3] = "UNKNOWN_DEVICE";
|
||
|
|
/**
|
||
|
|
* "The authenticity of this encrypted message can't be guaranteed on this device."
|
||
|
|
*
|
||
|
|
* ie: the key has been forwarded, or retrieved from an insecure backup.
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
EventShieldReason[EventShieldReason["AUTHENTICITY_NOT_GUARANTEED"] = 4] = "AUTHENTICITY_NOT_GUARANTEED";
|
||
|
|
/**
|
||
|
|
* The (deprecated) sender_key field in the event does not match the Ed25519 key of the device that sent us the
|
||
|
|
* decryption keys.
|
||
|
|
*
|
||
|
|
* @deprecated The sender_key field is not checked by matrix-sdk-crypto, and this value is therefore unused since
|
||
|
|
* the migration to matrix-sdk-crypto in v37.0.0.
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
EventShieldReason[EventShieldReason["MISMATCHED_SENDER_KEY"] = 5] = "MISMATCHED_SENDER_KEY";
|
||
|
|
/**
|
||
|
|
* The event was sent unencrypted in an encrypted room.
|
||
|
|
*
|
||
|
|
* @deprecated This has never been used. The fact it is here was due to a misunderstanding of the behaviour of
|
||
|
|
* `matrix-sdk-crypto`.
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
EventShieldReason[EventShieldReason["SENT_IN_CLEAR"] = 6] = "SENT_IN_CLEAR";
|
||
|
|
/**
|
||
|
|
* The sender was previously verified but changed their identity.
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
EventShieldReason[EventShieldReason["VERIFICATION_VIOLATION"] = 7] = "VERIFICATION_VIOLATION";
|
||
|
|
/**
|
||
|
|
* The `sender` field on the event does not match the owner of the device
|
||
|
|
* that established the Megolm session.
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
EventShieldReason[EventShieldReason["MISMATCHED_SENDER"] = 8] = "MISMATCHED_SENDER";
|
||
|
|
return EventShieldReason;
|
||
|
|
}({});
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
/** The result of a call to {@link CryptoApi.getOwnDeviceKeys} */
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
/**
|
||
|
|
* Information about the encryption of a successfully decrypted to-device message.
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
/**
|
||
|
|
* An error thrown by loadSessionBackupPrivateKeyFromSecretStorage indicating
|
||
|
|
* that the decryption key found in secret storage does not match the public key
|
||
|
|
* of the latest backup.
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
export class DecryptionKeyDoesNotMatchError extends Error {
|
||
|
|
constructor(message) {
|
||
|
|
super(message);
|
||
|
|
this.name = "DecryptionKeyDoesNotMatchError";
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
export * from "./verification.js";
|
||
|
|
export * from "./recovery-key.js";
|
||
|
|
export * from "./key-passphrase.js";
|
||
|
|
export * from "./CryptoEvent.js";
|
||
|
|
//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map
|